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ABSTRACT
It was with great sadness that the philosophical and ethical communities
noted the recent passing of Alan Wertheimer. It is not possible to engage
in serious work regarding international research ethics (nor much of politi-
cal philosophy more broadly) without encountering and wrestling with his
careful contributions. He was welcoming of discussion and generous with
his intellectual energies. Ongoing work in these areas will be so much the
poorer for his absence.
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AlanWertheimer makes a strong case for the claim that those who promulgate eth-
ical standards for the conduct of clinical research have a concurrent responsibility to
consider the consequences to which such promulgations give rise. Specifically, pro-
mulgators should consider whether compliance with their promulgationsmay have so-
called “self-defeating diversion effects” (4) on research from which participants can be
expected to receive a net benefit, causing trials to be relocated or forgone altogether
due to the increased costs associated with promulgation compliance. This possibil-
ity is of particular concern in lower- and middle-income countries (LMICs) because
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2  Diversion effects, incentive effects, and the goals of research ethics promulgations
“participation in research is often the only means by which people receive treatment
for a disease” or access to other ancillary care.1
Although compelling,Wertheimer’s case that such promulgations are self-defeating
depends upon a particular, undefended view of the motivation behind research ethics
promulgations (REPs), a view which ignores alternative, legitimate goals for REPs.
Moreover, this view of the goal of REPs seems closely linked to an underlyingmischar-
acterizationof the goals of the research enterprise itself.Given thatREPs canhave other
legitimate goals, I argue that Wertheimer’s concerns about diversion effects are at best
overstated, and at worst misplaced. Moreover, we must also consider what I refer to
as “incentive effects” of non-promulgation. Specifically, we should consider whether
the absence of such guiding principles among the standards offered by the world’s ma-
jor research ethics advisory groupsmight reinforce incentives that function tomaintain
existing levels of inequality, including the lack of access to needed healthcare in LMICs.
The diversion effects about which Wertheimer is concerned are specifically the
higher costs borne by sponsors who meet criteria such as conducting research which
is responsive to the health needs of host communities, providing established standards
of care to research participants, ensuring that interventions shown safe and effective are
made available to participants and/or host communities after the conclusion of a trial,
and providing ancillary care to participants in LMIC research to which they would oth-
erwise lack access. Insofar as complying with such promulgations would increase the
costs of conducting research in LMICs, Wertheimer reasons, this will divert resources
away from the conduct of additional trials which could benefit additional research par-
ticipants.
In assessing REPs, we should clearly distinguish between two different claims about
diversion effects which might be defended:
Strong Resource Diversion Effects: Promulgators of REPs have an ethical responsibility
to consider the consequences to which their promulgations give rise, and in particular
whether those promulgations are self-defeating insofar as they hurt precisely those people
they are designed to help.
WeakResourceDiversionEffects: Promulgators of REPs have an ethical responsibility to
consider the consequences to which their promulgations give rise, regardless of whether
those consequences are related to the goals informing such promulgations, or in what
way.
As I interpret him, Wertheimer seeks to defend Strong Resource Diversion Effects.
In particular,Wertheimer defends the claim that REPs are intended to “promote the in-
terests and autonomy” of both actual and prospective research subjects, and that such
promotion entails ensuring that the greatest number of impoverished individuals pos-
sible has the opportunity to benefit from participation in clinical research.
This is not an uncontroversial understanding of what is entailed by promoting the
interests and autonomyof research subjects.Nor is it clear that the goal of such promul-
gations is to promote the interests and autonomy of research subjects at all, rather than
1 Alan Wertheimer, The Ethics of Promulgating Principles of Research Ethics: The Problem of Diversion Effects, 2
JLBIOS 2, 32 (2015).
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to simply protect them. While this may seem a minor linguistic point, it actually tracks
an important distinction in how we conceptualize the proper aims of clinical research
itself. Wertheimer conceives of clinical research as ultimately a transaction between
researcher or sponsor and research participant, with protections such as prospective
risk/benefit assessment justifiedonly due to the inability of otherwise competent adults
to protect their own interests in clinical trials given their lack of biomedical knowledge.2
But clinical research is actually a social endeavor, with an explicitly social goal: the pro-
duction of valuable knowledge for the purpose of benefiting future patients and health-
care systems. Investigators not only don’t conduct research with the primary goal of
promoting the interests of research subjects, but they ought not insofar as the promo-
tion of research subjects’ interests undercuts the ability of a clinical trial to generate
socially valuable knowledge.3 Gold standard methodologies such as blinding to treat-
ment allocation and randomization, for example, could never be ethically justifiedwere
clinical trials conducted for the purpose of benefiting trial participants.
Rather, the entire body of research ethics promulgations can be viewed as reflecting
adesire to balance the goal of producing generalizable knowledgewhich can informand
improve the care of future patients against the need to protect research subjects from
harms theymight suffer as a result of amyopic focus on the value of research outcomes.
Conceiving of clinical trials as a transactionmerely between researcher and participant
obscures this social function, and contributes to the problematic misconception of re-
search as primarily about advancing the interests of current participants, rather than fu-
ture patients. When we are explicit about the goals of clinical research in generating
socially valuable knowledge, it becomes clearer how the goals of REPs may be very dif-
ferent from ensuring that benefits devolve to the greatest number of potential research
participants. Because the goal of research is not to benefit research participants, a more
accurate representation of the goal of REPs is the protection of actual research partic-
ipants from practices which serve the fundamental goal of clinical research, but which
if left unchecked might do so at an unjustified cost to the health and well-being of trial
participants. But note that if this is the goal of REPs, the existence of diversion effects
would not make REPs self-defeating, since such effects do not undermine the goal of
protecting those subjects who are enrolled in research from a bias in favor of experi-
mentality.
This shows that Wertheimer’s argument in defense of Strong Resource Diversion
Effects misses its mark. But what about Weak Resource Diversion Effects? Insofar as it
is not predicated on a particular view of the goals of REPs, Weak Resource Diversion
Effects is on face a more defensible claim. But Weak is also consistent with the idea
that concerns for diversion effects should be balanced against existing goals of REPs. In
fact, we might attribute various aims to the promulgation of research ethics standards
other than advancing the interests of research subjects and prospective research sub-
jects by ensuring maximal access to beneficial research. We might think, for example,
that one goal of research ethics promulgations is to ratchet up local standards of care
through the implementation of progressive improvements in the healthcare of research
2 AlanWertheimer, Is Payment a Benefit?, 27 BIOETHICS 105 (2013).
3 Samuel Hellman & Deborah S. Hellman,Of Mice But Not Men: Problems of the Randomized Clinical Trial, 324
NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1585 (1991).
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participants.4 LMIC communities often bear the burdens of biomedical research even
when those same communities are unable to benefit from the resultant knowledge due
to entrenched poverty, lack of infrastructure, or other complex vulnerabilities. One
interpretation of the aim of promulgations calling for responsiveness, the use of best
proven standards of care and prevention, access to treatments after the conclusion of
a trial, or the provision of ancillary care is that such provisions function to promote
incremental progress in health systems which otherwise might remain stagnant given
competing claims on local funding.
Wertheimermight reply that the claim inWeak still applies: insofar asREPs generate
increased costs and reduce the number of trials that can be conducted, there will be
fewer opportunities to use research as a tool for ratcheting up care.Thismay be correct,
but what it demonstrates is a need to balance the values of improving care within host
communities and the number of communities in which such improvements can occur.
Absent REPs, research may very well never function to ratchet up care, suggesting that
if such ratcheting is a worthwhile goal, REPs are a necessary step in promoting it.
Another plausible goal of research ethics promulgations is the protection of re-
search subjects fromexploitation by research sponsors, contract research organizations
(CROs), and investigators. The same incentives which drive sponsors and CROs to
seek host communities in LMICs provide powerful incentives to cut the costs associ-
ated with conducting research in those communities as much as possible. Absent con-
straints governing research interactions which demand a greater share of benefits for
research participants – whether through post-trial access, ancillary benefits, or other
mechanisms – communities and participants will rapidly race to the bottom with re-
gards to the benefits they’re willing to accept in exchange for participation in research.5
Such a race to the bottom should be of concern insofar as we think that the distribution
of the social surplus generated through clinical research ought to be informed by con-
siderations of fairness and justice rather than merely by the relevant bargaining power
of the individual parties involved in negotiating terms.
Even if we don’t think that justice or fairness ought to play a role in the distribution
of the social surplus generated in research, however, wemight have additional reason to
want to reduce or eliminate exploitation in LMIC research which provides yet another
potential goal for REPs. Specifically, we may have independent reason to protect the
reputation and social capital of the research enterprise itself. The ability of researchers
and sponsors to engage in the various self-interested activities which together combine
to result in the generation of socially valuable biomedical knowledge depends in large
part on continued social support of clinical research. That support comes in the form
of continued funding of research through government agencies and charitable giving,
the high esteem accorded to active research institutions and the researchers who popu-
late them, and the willingness to participate in research as subjects.6 This social capital
can be threatened in many ways, including via growing public awareness of a research
4 K Shapiro & SR Benatar,HIV Prevention Research and Global Inequality: Steps Towards Improved Standards of
Care, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 39 (2005).
5 Alex John London & Kevin J.S. Zollman, Research at the Auction Block: Problems for the Fair Benefits Approach
to International Research, 40 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 34 (2010).
6 Alex JohnLondon,ANon-PaternalisticModel of Research Ethics andOversight: Assessing the Benefits of Prospective
Review, 40 J. LAWMED. & ETHICS 930 (2012).
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enterprise in which many actors apparently fail to adequately respect the interests of
research subjects. Because the average citizen is not well-equipped to distinguish be-
tween those actors who tend to ensure a proportionate share of research benefits are
passed on to appropriate parties and those who do not, the loss of social capital de-
volves to all research stakeholders, and not only those involved in exploitative research.
The upshot can be a loss of public or philanthropic funding for research, a loss of willing
participants, or perhaps most troubling, the imposition of new legal regulations at the
state-level which ultimately make research even more costly and potentially preclude
more valuable research from occurring.
For example, Wertheimer highlights recent Indian regulation requiring research
sponsors to pay for research-related and other injuries and illnesses occurring to re-
search participants while on protocol as an instance of a counterproductively diver-
sionary regulation. But it is reasonable to think that this regulation was a direct result
of a growing lack of public trust of the research enterprise within India given a growing
awareness of significant exploitation in industry-sponsored trials in that country. Thus
the lack of broader enforcement or regulation on the basis of existing REPs resulted in
more demanding regulation, and ultimately created an even larger impediment to the
conduct of valuable research. Moreover, this example shows not what Wertheimer be-
lieves it to show, that the impositionofREPswill have diversion effects. Rather, it shows
that a regulatory approach to REPs will have diversion effects insofar as it lacks sufficient
reach. For REPs to effectively serve diverse goals such as protecting subjects from ex-
ploitation and ratcheting up care within local contexts, they must be established in a
way which provides incentives to a broad enough swath of researchers and sponsors.7
AlthoughWertheimer’s defenseof StrongResourceDiversionEffects dependsupon
a problematic understanding of the goals of REPs and the research enterprise itself,
Weak Resource Diversion Effects is more plausible. However, Weak is consistent with
the existence of a plurality of values which REPsmight be said to seek to promote.Thus
even if promulgators ought to be concerned about diversion effects, those effects must
be considered as weighed against the other legitimate goals of REPs.Moreover, there is
reason to think that Wertheimer’s concern about diversion effects is overstated where
there are possibilities for extending the reach of the incentives thereby generated, i.e.
through mechanisms which will impact a large enough proportion of research spon-
sors so as to preclude the race-to-the-bottom-style mentality of the CRO chief medical
officerWertheimer cites.
Alternatively, Wertheimer might have defended the following claim:
ResearchDiversion Effects: Promulgators of REPs have an ethical responsibility to con-
sider the consequences to which their promulgations give rise, and in particular whether
those promulgations are self-defeating insofar as they limit the number of important re-
search questions which might be answered.
Research Diversion Effects is more plausibly a concern about the counter-
productivity ofREPs, given that it ismore faithful to theunderlying goals of the research
enterprise. But a concern for Research Diversion Effects is likewise consistent with the
7 Danielle M. Wenner, Against Permitted Exploitation in Developing World Research Agreements, DEV. WORLD
BIOETHICS (2015) DOI:10.1111/dewb.12081.






6  Diversion effects, incentive effects, and the goals of research ethics promulgations
recognition of a plurality of motivations behind REPs which might outweigh Research
Diversion in terms of their importance to the overarching goal of biomedical progress.
This is again a matter of balancing competing values: in the absence of REPs, the re-
search enterprise might be undermined to such an extent as to have an even greater
negative impact on the number of important questions that can be answered.
Finally, both Weak Resource Diversion Effects and Research Diversion Effects are
consistent with the following:
Incentive Effects: Promulgators of REPs have an ethical responsibility to consider the
consequences towhich the absence of such promulgationsmight give rise, and in particu-
lar whether the lack of promulgations might generate incentives which entrench existing
disparities in access to health and healthcare.
Specifically, wemight think that the guidance documents published by international
organizations such as theWorldMedical Association, theCouncil for InternationalOr-
ganizations ofMedical Sciences, and theNuffieldCouncil on Bioethics serve an impor-
tant social function by drawing the attention of sponsors, researchers, and the public to
the kinds of ethical concerns which can arise in LMIC research due to a background
context of vast inequality. In drawing public attention to these concerns, such promul-
gations provide incentives in the form of social approbation to research sponsors who
might otherwise strongly prefer to cut costs by ignoring ethical obligations to research
subjects and host communities, and generate the race to the bottom that occurs absent
constraints on research agreements.
Consider, for example, the costs associatedwith conducting a vaccine trial on a pop-
ulation with access to the best proven means of prevention versus conducting it on a
population without such access. For any vaccine to be shown effective, sufficient num-
bers of participantsmust contract the studydisease inorder to showa statistically signif-
icant difference between the intervention and control arms. Access to the best proven
means of preventionwill therefore drastically increase the necessary sample size, aswell
as associated costs. Given this cost differential, profit-seeking research sponsors have a
vested interest in the ability to locate populationswho lack such access, and this interest
generates incentives to ensure the continued existence of such populations.8
Moreover, industry sponsors wield a disproportionate ability to influence the avail-
ability of effective interventions at an affordable price within LMICs. One of the most
direct means of exercising this influence is via the active promotion of robust intel-
lectual property protections which prevent the development of inexpensive generics.
These stringent protections present significant barriers to the ability of LMICs to ad-
dress local health deficits, entrenching the very lack of access to effective interventions
which allows research sponsors to continue to conduct research in LMICs at a steeply
discounted cost.
Without consistent regulation, the conspicuous absence of REPs demanding higher
standards of care, responsiveness, ancillary care, and post-trial access may generate
new or reinforce the existing incentives which operate on research stakeholders (and
in particular, industry sponsors) to ensure ongoing barriers to access for populations
8 Thomas Pogge, Testing Our Drugs on the Poor Abroad, in EXPLOITATION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE
ETHICS OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 105 (Jennifer S. Hawkins & Ezekiel J. Emanuel eds., 2008).
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in LMICs. Should governance bodies and international organizations refrain from the
promulgation of ethical standards for international research, this would amount to the
removal of some of the very few existing disincentives to the continued support of an
intellectual property regime which serves precisely this end.
Wertheimer’s claim that research ethics promulgators ought to be concerned about
the possible diversion effects of their promulgations can be interpreted in at least three
ways.The interpretation thatWertheimer defends, Strong Resource Diversion Effects,
does not accurately represent the goals of research ethics promulgations or those of
the research enterprise. There are two more plausible interpretations of Wertheimer’s
claim, Weak Resource Diversion Effects, and Research Diversion Effects, but they are
each consistent with a plurality of motivations behind REPs and the possibility that
any diversion effects are outweighed by the values associated with those motivations.
Finally, while either of the alternative versions of Wertheimer’s claimmay be accurate,
promulgators ought also to consider the potential incentive effects of failing to issue
such promulgations.
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